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Drawing on stakeholder theory, this study seeks to gain an insight into the stakeholder 
management strategies used by the Procuring Authority in Irish road Public Private 
Partnerships to manage its complex stakeholder relationships.   
 
Based on interviews with 38 key stakeholders the findings of this study indicate that 
the allocation, transfer and management of risk impact on the quality of stakeholder 
relationships. A proactive and somewhat accommodating approach is used by the 
Procuring Authority in its relationship with the Special Purpose Vehicle, while there 
is some evidence that collaborative relationships exist between the public sector 























1. Introduction  
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s) can be defined as ‘cooperation between public 
and private actors with a durable character in which actors develop mutual products 
and/or services and in which risk, costs and benefits are shared’ (Klijn & Teisman, 
2003, p.137).  PPPs  are often advocated on the premise that they provide better Value 
for Money (VFM) than traditional procurement (Demirag, Dubnick, & Khadaroo, 
2004; Nisar, 2007; Demirag & Khadaroo, 2008; Reeves, 2011; Shaoul, 2011) by 
transferring risk to the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as well as resulting in 
improved design and more efficient work practices (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; KPMG, 
2015). In order to obtain VFM, risk should be allocated to the party most adept at 
managing it (Department of the Environment, Heritage & Local Government, 2003; 
Department of Finance, 2006; Demirag, Khadaroo, Stapleton, & Stevenson, 2012) 
therefore it is important to understand how risk is allocated, transferred and managed 
in PPPs. In terms of understanding these risk related issues in PPPs, recent research 
concentrates primarily on public sector and financiers’ perceptions of risks 
(Akinyemi, Ojiako, Maguire, Steel, & Anyaegbunam, 2009; Asenova & Beck, 2010; 
Demirag et al., 2010; 2011; 2012), which only provides a partial understanding of risk 
in PPPs. Prior work has generally focused on relations developed between the public 
and the private sectors in risk transfer and/or its management (Edwards & Shaoul, 
2003; English & Baxter, 2010; Iseki & Houtman, 2012; Demirag et al., 2012). 
Previous empirical work fails to explore different stakeholder relationships within 
PPPs such as the relationships between the public sector bodies in the roads sector, 
which is a significant lacuna in the literature given that it is the most dominant sector 
in terms of European PPP expenditure (European PPP Expertise Centre, (EPEC) 
2014).  
 
Prior Irish PPP research has examined aspects of risk and stakeholder relationships in 
educational PPPs (Reeves, 2008; Petersen, 2011). Using a multi-level governance 
approach, Petersen, (2011) found that public sector stakeholders had conflicting 
objectives and while Reeves (2008) refers to risk transfer, his work focused primarily 
on the contractual relationships between the public and the private sector and the 
contractor and schools in educational PPPs (Reeves 2008). This paper builds on this 
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existing work and examines the perceptions of multiple stakeholders in toll road PPPs 
through the use of stakeholder theory (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001) and provides an insight into how public and private sector 
stakeholders are managed by the Procuring Authority in Irish road PPPs. There is 
some evidence to suggest that the allocation, transfer and management of risks may 
have a significant bearing on the quality of stakeholder relationships in PPPs (Reeves, 
2008; Norton & Blanco, 2009; English & Baxter, 2010). This paper thus seeks to 
examine: 
 
1. How risks are allocated and managed in Irish toll road PPPs and how this impacts 
on the quality of relationships between public sector bodies. 
2. How risks are allocated and managed in Irish toll road PPPs and how this impacts 
on the quality of relationships between the Procuring Authority and the SPV. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the Irish roads 
sector with its key stakeholders. Section 3 examines the allocation, transfer and 
management of risk in PPPs, with previous empirical work in this area provided. 
Section 4 outlines the theoretical framework and explores the relationship between the 
public sector bodies responsible for PPPs and the relationship between the Procuring 
Authority and the SPV. In section 5, an overview of the research methods is provided. 
Section 6 presents the empirical findings where we examine the relationships between 
the Procuring Authority (National Roads Authority (NRA)) and the SPV and the 
Procuring Authority and other public sector stakeholders in the PPP process such as 
the Department of Transport Tourism and Sport (DOTTAS) and the National 
Development Finance Agency (NDFA). Quotations from the interviews are provided 
where appropriate to support the findings. The implications of the findings for VFM 
and taxpayers are then discussed in the final section.  
 
2.1 PFI and the adoption of PPPs in Ireland  
The concept of New Public Management which evolved in the late 1970s/early 1980s 
(Hood, 1991) involves a market type model, utilising the private sector more in the 
delivery of public services. The modernisation of the public sector was central to the 
ideology underpinning New Public Management (Connolly, Reeves, & Wall, 2009; 
Demirag, Khadaroo, & Clark, 2009; Lapsley, 2009), with the emphasis on achieving 
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closer cooperative relationships between the public and private stakeholders 
(Wettenhall, 2007). Relationships between stakeholders from both the public and 
private sector, particularly in terms of sharing risk, were a cornerstone to Labour’s 
‘Third Way’ philosophy in the United Kingdom (UK) (Broadbent & Guthrie, 2008), 
with the Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
1
 a prime example of where this occurred 
(Jupe, 2012). Implemented in the 1990s to improve roads, schools, prisons and 
hospitals, PFI was pivotal in terms of modernising the UK public sector. Upon 
assuming office in 1997, Labour reinvigorated the PFI programme and rebranded the 
PFI, resulting in the term PPP becoming more commonplace, with PFI included under 
this definition (Shaoul, 2005). Using the UK PFI model as a blueprint, the Irish 
Government introduced PPPs in 1999 (Demirag & Burke, 2013), based upon the 
premise of achieving optimal risk transfer and obtaining VFM (Department of 
Finance, 2007). 
 
PPPs were initially implemented across a range of sectors such as roads, waste 
management and education by the Irish Government (Reeves & Ryan, 2007) who 
have produced two National Development Plans, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 (see 
figure 1) which outline their proposed investment in Irish roads. A recent report by 
the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation (2013) has highlighted the need to 
improve Ireland’s infrastructure, advocating that PPPs play a vital role in improving 
the country’s roads (Irish Business and Employers Confederation, 2013). Ireland’s 
initial PPP roads programme yielded €2.1 billion in private sector funding (Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation, KPMG, 2011). Furthermore, Ireland was 7
th
 
with regard to the value of PPP deals across Europe in 2014 (EPEC, 2014) and in 
terms of Irish PPP expenditure, the roads sector accounts for the majority of the 
outlay (Demirag & Burke, 2013), with €4.345 billion invested in Irish roads by April 
2013 (Reeves, 2015). Recent initiatives outlined by the Irish Government to stimulate 
PPP roads investment included the Government Infrastructure Stimulus Plan. An 
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 Connolly and Wall (2009, p.1) define PFI as when ‘a private sector organisation usually undertakes to 
design, build, finance and operate a property in order to provide the required service demanded by the 
public sector body responsible for the ultimate delivery of service’.  Although many countries have 
adopted broadly similar policies to the UK’s PFI, the PPP arrangements differ internationally 
(Demirag, Khadaroo, & Stapleton, 2015).  PPPs involve a vast array of partnership models between the 
public and private sectors including joint ventures and public social private partnerships therefore the 




€850 million investment is expected in three PPP roads projects under Phase One of 
this plan (Department of Public Expenditure & Reform, 2012): The M 11 Gorey to 
Enniscorthy PPP project includes the construction of the Enniscorthy Bypass with 26 
km of existing road also being converted into motorway; while the N25 New Ross 
Bypass project involves building a new 13.6 km road accompanied by a new bridge; 
The N17/N18 Gort to Tuam scheme encompasses a 57 km motorway which will 
involve the construction of a bypass of Clarinbridge, Claregalway and Tuam 
(Department of Public Expenditure & Reform, 2012). 
 
The Irish Business and Employers Confederation (2013) suggest that market 
confidence may be restored where there is a pipeline of projects and the deals are well 
structured. This is important as many Irish PPP projects have been postponed or 
abandoned in recent years (Reeves, Palcic, & Flannery, 2015) while a recent study by 
Burke and Demirag (2015) suggests that financiers in Irish toll road PPPs are 
becoming increasingly apprehensive regarding the ability of the Irish Government to 
meet future payments on PPP schemes.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
2.2 Overview of key stakeholders in Irish road PPPs 
 
There are a myriad of different stakeholders
2
 (see figure 2) involved in the Irish roads 
PPP process such as the Department of Finance, the DOTTAS, the PPP unit, Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the 
Construction Industry Federation, the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NRA. 
The Irish Business and Employers Confederation, the Construction Industry 
Federation, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the PPP unit all had an input into 
the negotiation of the Policy Framework for PPPs in Ireland (Demirag & Burke, 
2013) (see table 1 for a detailed description of these key stakeholders, explaining their 
roles in the Irish PPP process). The PPP unit was established in 1999 within the 
Department of Finance to help formulate PPP policy, disseminate expertise and to 
provide advice to Irish Government departments responsible for PPP projects 
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 This study interviewed the majority of the stakeholders included in table 1. Interviews were 
conducted with members of the Department of Transport Tourism and Sport, NRA, National 
Development Finance Agency, Irish Business and Employer’s Confederation, the Irish Congress of 
Trade Unions, the Comptroller and Auditor General and the PPP Unit. 
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(Department of the Environment, Heritage & Local Government, 2003). In order to 
advance the PPP process in Ireland, both interdepartmental and informal advisory 
groups on PPPs have been formed with representatives from the NRA, the Railway 
Procurement Agency and the NDFA included in the Interdepartmental Group. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The informal advisory group comprises of members of the interdepartmental group on 
PPPs together with representatives of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation and the Construction Industry Federation. 
These groups have regular meetings to consider important PPP issues (Demirag & 
Burke, 2013) 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Responsibility for overseeing the development and implementation of roads in Ireland 
resides with the DOTTAS. The procurement of road PPPs is conducted by the NRA, 
with the majority of all other PPP projects procured by the NDFA (Petersen, 2011). 
Established in 2003, the NDFA provides advice on PPP projects to both the NRA and 
the DOTTAS, with all public service projects funded through the private sector being 
referred to the NDFA (Demirag & Burke, 2013). In August 2015, a merger occurred 
between the NRA and the Railway Procurement Agency to establish Transport 
Infrastructure Ireland in order to share the expertise of the two former bodies; this 
new organisation will be responsible for implementing all road and light rail projects 
in Ireland (http://tii.ie/).  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the stakeholder relationships which have developed within the 
Irish roads PPP framework and highlights the complexity of PPP arrangements and 
the vast array of stakeholders involved in the PPP process. Trust, flexibility and 
goodwill are other factors that may contribute to the quality of stakeholder 
relationships in PPPs (see table 2). Demirag and Burke (2013) identify three 
stakeholder relationships; firstly public-public relationships (Greasley, Watson, & 
Patel, 2008), which relates to the relationships between the public sector bodies; 
secondly, agency relationships which applies to the public-private relationship 
between the Procuring Authority and the SPV; and thirdly, the relationship between 
the SPV members which is referred to as the club relationship. Club relationships are 
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formed by stakeholder groups for shared benefits and stakeholders within the club 
collaborate and share information and resources with horizontal accountability 
between the different stakeholders (Smith, Mathur, & Skelcher, 2006). Within the 
SPV, contractors and financiers share knowledge and rely on the financial resources 
they each possess (Demirag & Burke, 2013). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We now examine the literature regarding risk related issues in PPPs. 
 
3. Allocation, transfer and management of risk in PPPs 
Li, Akintoye, Edwards and Hardcastle (2005a) used a questionnaire study to examine 
the allocation of risk in construction projects in the UK. They argue that some risks 
should be borne by the public sector while other risks ought to be shared between the 
public and private sector and it is suggested that project specific risks are best handled 
by the private sector. Abednego and Ogunlana (2006) examined the perceptions of 
various stakeholders on the risk allocation process (see table 3 below for an example 
of a risk allocation matrix in Irish PPPs) in a toll road project in Indonesia and similar 
to the work of Li et al. (2005a) they also found that the distribution of risk was viewed 
as important, particularly as it impacts on VFM. Contracting parties were at ease once 
the repercussions from risks that occurred could be minimised, while the timing of 
risk allocation was also crucial in terms of project success. Roumboutsos and 
Anagnostopoulos (2008) also used a multi-stakeholder approach examining 
contractors, financiers and public sector bodies’ attitudes to risk in Greek PPPs 
through the use of a survey and found that stakeholders were satisfied with the risk 
allocation process, but deviated in their view of what the key risks were. For example, 
the financiers ranked archaeological risk as being very important while it was viewed 
as less significant by the public sector and contractors. Also, public opposition to PPP 
projects was perceived to be more important by the public sector than by the 
contractors and financiers. Ke, Wang, Chan and Lam (2010) conducted a study 
encompassing Chinese PPP projects from a range of sectors such as roads, waste and 
water from which they also ascertained the risk allocation preferences of academics 
8 
 
and practitioners through the use of a Delphi survey. 37 key risks were identified 
following telephone interviews and a comprehensive literature review and 
respondents were required to classify risks into five categories. They found that 
expropriation risk should be purely allocated to the public sector and they should 
largely retain 12 further risks including land acquisition and approval. It was 
suggested that 14 risks should be distributed equally between the parties such as 
archaeological risk, weather conditions and environmental protection. Similar to the 
work of Li et al. (2005a) and Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) it was felt 
that force majeure risk should be shared between the public and private sector. The 
other 10 risks, which were all project related risks such as financial, construction and 
residual value risk, should be mainly allocated to the SPV with no risks purely 
transferred to the SPV. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Hood, Frazer and McGavery (2006) are sceptical about the actual level of risk transfer 
in UK PPPs and believe that the private sector benefits as not much risk is actually 
transferred from the public to the private sector and there is some evidence to suggest 
that PFI deals appear to provide better VFM for the private sector than the taxpayer 
(The British House of Commons, 2011). Concurring with this, a study by Shaoul, 
Stafford, & Stapleton, (2012a) examining transportation PPP projects in the UK 
argues that risk is not transferred to the SPV but is transferred to subcontractors and 
their workers, as well as the taxpayers and users, thus undermining the whole 
rationale underlying effective risk transfer. In an Irish context, a recent report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (2012) concurred that PPPs are costing the taxpayer 
considerable sums of money.  
EPEC (2011) argued that the provision of state guarantees may be necessary to 
improve the risk allocation process and alleviate funding concerns for PPP projects. In 
this context, for example, the use of guarantees in PPPs, through the provision of a 
minimum revenue guarantee, proved to be hugely beneficial for the private sector in 
the New Southern Railway project in Sydney (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). Demand 
levels turned out to be far less than the originally anticipated 48,000 trips per day, 
leading to the public sector intervening and assuming a significant amount of demand 
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risk through a minimum revenue guarantee in order to compensate the SPV. This 
project cost the public sector millions of dollars, which highlights the importance of 
carefully estimating and allocating the risks in PPP projects before they become 
operational (Ng & Loosemore, 2007). In contrast to the New Southern Railway 
project in Australia, a study by Chen and Hubbard (2012) examining risk allocation 
found that the public sector failed to honour guarantees in a PPP toll road contract in 
China. It was stipulated in the original contract that demand risk would be shared and 
that the SPV would be guaranteed a return and a share of revenue. However, when 
traffic failed to reach expected levels, the local government authority refused to 
honour the promise they made with respect to guaranteed profits and the SPV 
shouldered the demand risk (Chen & Hubbard, 2012). This case study demonstrates 
that risk may not always be allocated to the most appropriate party and that guarantees 
may not always be respected in PPP projects. Guarantees have become more 
prevalent in PPP projects in order to alleviate financiers’ concerns (Shaoul et al., 
2012b; Demirag et al., 2015).  
 
Demirag et al. (2012) conducted a study involving six PFI projects with equity and 
senior debt financiers across a range of sectors including hospitals, prisons, roads, 
schools and social housing. They found that the senior debt financiers were concerned 
regarding the financial reputation of companies that make up the SPV as they did not 
want risks reverting to them. Therefore some risks were transferred to SPV 
companies, despite them not having the requisite experience to manage them. 
Subsequently many SPV contractors were either unable to manage risk or the risks 
tended to be insured, hedged and diffused by a number of private sector partners. 
Examining three UK shadow road projects, Akbiyikli, Dikmen and Eaton (2011) 
similarly found that financiers were apprehensive regarding risk, and due to the extent 
of funding they provide they also wanted risk to be allocated appropriately in PPPs. 
They concluded that when evaluated in relation to other modes of procurement, UK 
PFI road projects are providing improved VFM and risk transfer and the payment 
mechanism incentivises the SPV to provide a high quality road. Moreover, funding 
costs will alter among projects based on the level of risk and how it is allocated. In an 
Irish context, Reeves (2013) highlights the complexity of demonstrating VFM in 
water PPPs and the difficulties in achieving the requisite level of risk transfer in Irish 
social housing PPPs. More recently, Khadaroo (2014) additionally raised questions 
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regarding the extent of risk transfer in two Northern Ireland PFI school projects, 
finding risk transfer and VFM to be a very subjective process. Risk may have been 
estimated incorrectly by the financial advisors working on the PFI projects resulting 
in the PFI option appearing to be more attractive than conventional procurement 
(Khadaroo, 2014). 
 
The next section outlines the theoretical framework used in the study. 
 
4.1 Theoretical framework 
Stakeholder theory was deemed the most appropriate theory for exploring the research 
questions for this study. Other theoretical approaches such as agency and incomplete 
theory were also evaluated, however the use of incomplete contract theory was not 
adopted because it is more appropriate in a longitudinal study of PPPs, as potential 
discrepancies or missing requirements in the PPP contract can be better evaluated at 
the end of the PPP’s lifecycle. Agency theory was also not pursued as it examines just 
the principal-agent relationship (public sector and SPV) and not the interrelationships 
between a number of stakeholder groups as explored in this study.  
 
In the formative work on stakeholder theory, Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines a 
stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives’, while El-Gohary, Osman and Diraby 
(2006, p. 596) define stakeholders as ‘any person or organisation that has a legitimate 
interest in a project’. Businesses should incorporate the interests of all key 
stakeholders and they should not be merely viewed as tools towards maximising 
profitability (Gibson, 2000). Donaldson and Preston (1995) explain that stakeholders 
are individuals or groups with a valid interest in the firm and are identified by virtue 
of this interest, even if the firm has very little interest in them. The interests of every 
stakeholder are valuable to the firm, as individual stakeholders contribute to the firm 
in different ways; moreover, as multiple stakeholders exist within organisations 
(Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), businesses should strive to satisfy them all so that 
they prosper continuously in the long term (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). 
Satisfying the needs of every stakeholder is very problematic (Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001) yet unless all their interests are considered, achieving 
organisational goals will be difficult (Clarkson, 1995). Mitchell et al. (1997) argue 
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that stakeholders may possess one or more of the following relationship traits: firstly, 
the power possessed by the stakeholder and their ability to influence the firm; 
secondly, the legitimacy of the relationship between the stakeholder and the firm; and 
thirdly, the urgency of the stakeholders’ claim on the organisation. Although they may 
overlap, power and legitimacy can exist irrespective of each other. Power refers to the 
extent to which stakeholder’s can impose their will in relationships with other 
stakeholders, while legitimacy relates to the degree to which a stakeholders’ claims 
are worthy of consideration and urgency concerns the speed with which stakeholders’ 
needs are met. The legitimacy of stakeholders’ needs, the power they possess, and the 
urgency of their claims must be considered carefully (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Mitchell et al., 1997); moreover as these factors are dynamic and may change over 
time, they need to be continuously monitored (Chinyio & Akintoye, 2008). 
Drawing on the work of Mitchell et al. (1997), Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) 
identify the stage at which stakeholders become important to the firm and how 
companies treat stakeholders when their importance to the firm changes. They 
acknowledge that the saliency of stakeholders may change over time and alter 
throughout the organisation’s life. Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) suggest that 
various strategies should be used with different stakeholders such as reaction, 
defence, accommodation and proaction (the findings section (section 6) assesses the 
strategies used by the Irish Procuring Authority to manage risk through stakeholder 
relationships in Irish PPPs). Proactively managing stakeholders involves doing as 
much as possible to address their concerns; therefore those that are integral to the 
company’s survival, such as employees and customers (primary stakeholders3), 
should be proactively managed or, at the very minimum, accommodated (Jawahar & 
McLaughlin, 2001). Furthermore, Chinyio and Akintoye (2008) argue that 
organisations should proactively manage stakeholders in order to maintain good 
relationships rather than just responding when difficulties with stakeholders occur. 
Accommodation incorporates a less active approach to stakeholders as the company 
accepts that it is accountable to stakeholders but it will negotiate with them on certain 
                                                 
3
According to Clarkson (1995), a primary stakeholder is one whose continuing involvement is 
necessary for the firm’s survival. This would include investors, employees, customers and suppliers. 
There are a number of significant stakeholders such as the equity investors, senior debt financiers and 
public sector stakeholders (all primary stakeholders) who have legitimate interests in how risk is 
allocated and transferred in PPPs 
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issues rather than just accepting the stakeholders’ perspective. In contrast, a strategy 
of defense involves just doing the minimum for stakeholders that is required legally. 
A reactive strategy involves being negative towards addressing stakeholders concerns 
or disregarding the stakeholders completely. Defensive and/or reactive strategies tend 
to be used for stakeholders of less importance but as Jawahar & McLaughlin  (2001) 
note, these two strategies are riskier than proactive strategies. 
4.2.1 Relationship between public sector bodies 
Siemiatycki (2011) points out that one agency or department within the public sector 
will act as the main public sector sponsor (see figure 3 in section 2.2 for an overview 
of the key stakeholders, including the public sector bodies and their relationships in 
PPPs). As many government agencies and departments are involved in promoting and 
implementing PPPs there is the potential for conflict between them and hence an 
accommodating or proactive approach to stakeholder management may fail to 
emerge. Co-operation and commitment among the public sector team is necessary 
(Ahadzi & Bowles, 2004), as a number of public sector stakeholders may be involved 
in implementing PPPs and allocating risk. Chung, Hensher and Rose (2010) found 
that there was no standard framework for PPP procurement in Australia and different 
approaches were adopted by the various government entities in each state. The public 
sector agencies implemented some PPP deals without the involvement of the 
Treasury, thus indicating that a reactive approach to stakeholder management may 
have been evident. Koppenjan (2005) identified some difficulties in developing trust 
and encouraging collaboration between public sector stakeholders in the Netherlands 
suggesting a defensive approach was present. Some of these stakeholders were found 
to have conflicting goals and objectives, which subsequently led to difficulties in 
achieving effective co-ordination. In a similar study, Van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis 
and Veenswijk (2008) examined two large scale PPP projects in the Netherlands and 
Australia. In the Netherlands project (The Environ infrastructure PPP project) they 
found that cultural problems were evident between public sector stakeholders in the 
PPP, which necessitated the intervention of the Netherland’s Transport Authority in a 
reactive manner. Petersen (2011) found that various public sector bodies had different 
reasons for pursuing PPPs in Ireland. For example, The Department of Finance’s 
primary motivation was to move capital expenditure off-balance sheet, which requires 
considerable risk transfer, while the Department of Education and Science wanted to 
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ensure that particular education projects were built. Furthermore, Petersen (2011) also 
noted that the level of interaction between various Irish Government departments has 
been reduced as the NDFA acts as a single entity in procuring PPPs from a number of 
different sectors and this has led to less conflict between departments. A key 
contribution of this paper to literature is that it expands on this previous work by 
examining these public-public relationships as well as the relationship between the 
Procuring Authority and the SPV in Irish road PPPs in more detail.   
 
4.2.2 Relationship between the Procuring Authority and the SPV 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) summarised research on PPPs in a range of 
countries, across a number of sectors including health and social enterprise, and 
identified a number of factors that help improve the quality of stakeholder 
relationships. Horizontal structures without hierarchies, and trust based relationships 
comprising of both formal and informal relationships are viewed as important in 
developing such relationships. Synergistic relationships between partners, consensus 
based decision making and shared accountability for results can also improve 
relationships in PPPs. By combining the capabilities of the private and public 
stakeholders, greater synergies can be achieved (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011).  
Similarly, Norton and Blanco (2009) who conducted a comparative study on 
stakeholder management in UK and Spanish PPPs found that a stakeholder network-
based approach was adopted in Spain, which involved dialogue and consultation 
between the public sector and its key stakeholders such as the private sector and the 
general public. This collaborative stakeholder orientated approach was used to resolve 
any potential disputes through the spirit of the contract. Correspondingly Li et al. 
(2005b) who examined PPP construction projects in the UK through a questionnaire 
study found that the chances of a PPP’s success increases, if a project consists of the 
right stakeholders with similar goals. The findings also indicate that stakeholder 
management and stakeholder relationships are likely to be at the heart of an 
effectively functioning PPP and there is also a need for stakeholders to respect each 
other’s goals in the process (Li et al., 2005b). They also highlight a number of critical 
success factors for successful PPPs such as the formation of a strong SPV consortium, 
the availability of finance and optimal risk allocation. 
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The sharing of risk between the public and private sector may also impact on the 
quality of stakeholder relationships in infrastructure projects and such risk sharing 
provides performance incentives for the SPV (Brinkerehoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). 
Examining five Australian longitudinal prison PPP case studies, English and Baxter 
(2010) also found that risk transfer had a significant bearing on the relationship 
between the Procuring Authority and the SPV. A co-ordinated and accommodating 
stakeholder approach became prevalent between the Procuring Authority and the SPV 
over time as increased trust and goodwill between the partners developed with a more 
acceptable level of risk transfer to the SPV.  Arguably, the Spanish stakeholder based 
approach is more pragmatic to risk transfer as risk is retained by the public sector 
where necessary, while the public sector may also be willing to underwrite projects in 
order to reduce costs and alleviate private sector concerns, thus by implication 
improving the quality of the relationship between the Procuring Authority and the 
SPV (Norton and Blanco, 2009). Acerete et al. (2010, p. 48) refer to this underwriting 
of risk as ‘privatising the benefits and nationalising the costs’.  
Based on the framework of Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) discussed earlier in this 
section it would appear that the stakeholder management strategies adopted by the 
Spanish public sector are both proactive and accommodating in terms of dealing with 
stakeholders concerns in the PPP process. In contrast, the UK approach was viewed as 
less flexible and more contractual, with risk transfer rather than risk sharing appearing 
to be the overriding objective for the public sector. In essence, the UK Government 
are satisfied to outsource the provision of public services to the private sector with a 
reliance on the contract if difficulties emerge (Norton & Blanco, 2009; Edwards & 
Shaoul, 2003). Examining stakeholder relationships between the contractor and the 
client, Reeves (2008) found that the relationship represented more of a transactional 
rather than a collaborative stakeholder approach in school PPPs in the Republic of 
Ireland. Collaboration, in the sense of ensuring effective exchange, was the single 
aspect viewed by both the public and private sector as demonstrating evidence of 
collaborative relationships in the Irish schools sector. This co-operative relationship, 
with negotiation being used to resolve difficulties, ensured a more lenient approach to 
the implementation of penalties. A tolerant approach towards risk transfer from the 
public to the private sector indicates that the Procuring Authority may have been 
accommodating towards the SPV, yet it also poses some questions about the extent of 
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risk transfer in the contracts, as the use of PPPs is largely justified upon this. However 
it would appear that allowing some leeway regarding penalties helped a ‘quid pro 
quo’ relationship to develop between the Procuring Authority and the SPV which 
helped ensure the effective functioning of the PPP (Reeves, 2008). Both the private 
and in particular the public sector, indicated a preference for referring to the contract 
when difficulties arose, however the development of trust between the two parties was 
not inhibited by the contractual nature of the relationship. The length of the contract 
and the constructive use of the contract to solve any grievances contributed towards 
building a trusting relationship. 
The next section will discuss the research methods, which involved the use of in depth 
semi-structured interviews. 
 
5. Research methods 
A multi stakeholder approach allowed the researchers to interview a wide range of 
key stakeholders through semi-structured interviews across three PPP schemes. 
Following a detailed examination of the relevant literature, a pilot interview was 
conducted with a concessionaire member on one of the PPP schemes to shape the 
interview schedule. The interviews were carried out using open ended questions, 
which allowed the interviewer to probe on interesting information in the interviews. A 
dictaphone was used to record the interviews, which the interviewees were given 
control of in case they wanted to pause the interview at any stage. The QSR Nvivo 9 
Qualitative data package was used to code the data. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, 
p.128) explain that interview analysis can be improved by using an array of 
knowledgeable interviewees who interpret the research questions with contrasting 
points of view. In-depth interviews are considered to be the primary qualitative 
method and interviews may be structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2009; Bryman & Bell, 2011). Bryman and Bell (2011) 
outline how in a semi-structured interview, the interviewer will try to cover specific 
topics, though there is a degree of flexibility allowed. Questions may not necessarily 
be asked in the sequence initially anticipated and interesting areas that emerge in the 




40 semi-structured interviews were conducted with 36 stakeholders between February 
2009 and July 2012. The stakeholders were identified on key PPP databases, 
including government websites, and assurances were provided to interviewees 
regarding confidentiality and anonymity. The study also involved a comprehensive 
analysis of secondary data from annual reports, government documents and 
guidelines, internal documents, company reports, newspaper articles, print media and 
websites (for example, http://www.nra.ie/ and http://ppp.gov.ie/). This data, 
triangulated with in-depth, semi-structured interviews with all the relevant 
stakeholders, enabled us to obtain a more thorough understanding of how risk is 
allocated, transferred and managed through stakeholder relationships in PPPs. 
Interviews were conducted with a variety of stakeholders within the SPV such as 
contractors, operators, senior debt financiers and equity financiers. In order to 
ascertain public sector perceptions, members of the NRA, the NDFA and the 
DOTTAS were interviewed as they are responsible for key decisions pertaining to 
how risk is transferred in Irish toll road PPPs. Other relevant stakeholders who are 
actively involved in the implementation and development of the Irish PPP process 
such as the Irish PPP unit, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the Irish Business 
and Employers Confederation, were also interviewed. 
 
The study has a number of limitations. Most notably, it was restricted to the analysis 
of three Irish PPP toll road schemes, therefore the results should be treated with 
caution when trying to generalise these findings to toll road PPPs outside Ireland. A 
study comprising of a larger sample of toll road PPP case schemes could have made 
the results more generalisable. Another limiting factor is that stakeholder relationships 
may change overtime. This suggests that the Procuring Authority may need to 
monitor more closely the stakeholders involved in road PPPs in order to understand 
their needs. Some stakeholders may become more salient and powerful overtime; 
therefore all stakeholders’ needs and interests should be identified and monitored 
continuously. A longitudinal study of Irish PPP toll road schemes would help to 
understand if stakeholder’s perceptions and relationships alter as PPPs become 
operational over longer time periods. 
6. Empirical findings  
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The next section discusses the relationships between the public sector bodies and 
between the Procuring Authority and the SPV, and some evidence is provided to show 
how the allocation, transfer and management of risk in PPPs may impact on the 
quality of these relationships.  
6.1 Relationship between public sector bodies in PPPs 
This section explores the relationship between the public sector bodies responsible for 
allocating risk in Irish toll road PPPs. In this respect the relationship between the 
NRA, DOTTAS, NDFA and other public sector stakeholders is explored. 
The findings indicate that the DOTTAS was satisfied that the Procuring Authority 
effectively allocates risk in PPPs, therefore they appear to operate more at a distance 
and tend not to interfere in the risk allocation process as a Procuring Authority 
representative explained:  
We are constantly giving them the updates as they require them on the various schemes, 
but they don’t get involved in the nitty gritty and they are not involved in any aspects of 
risk transfer, risk allocation or risk quantification, that is a matter for the NRA (Procuring 
Authority official). 
The findings also indicate that the other public sector stakeholders perceive that the 
Procuring Authority has the competency and expertise to allocate risk and deliver 
Ireland’s roads programme. There is some evidence to suggest that strong public-
public relationships may have been fostered between the public sector stakeholders 
delivering Irish PPPs. This was emphasised by the DOTTAS official who highlighted 
the collaborative and trustful relationship between the Procuring Authority and the 
NDFA: 
The NRA has built up very substantial expertise in both engineering and procurement. 
The NDFA is involved with NRA projects. The NRA involves the NDFA for advice and 
support but the NRA continues to do what it has built up the expertise in doing…I would 
trust the NRA in terms of tying everything down in the contracts…We are now looking 
at how we can perhaps broaden the role of the NRA (DOTTAS official).  
The Procuring Authority appears to have the autonomy and power to make key 
decisions on how risk is transferred in PPPs. A close relationship has been built up 
between the DOTTAS and the Procuring Authority and a mutual respect exists 
between both organisations as a DOTTAS official explained: 
Risk allocation is for the Procuring Authority rather than us, we don’t get involved and 
we leave it to the Procuring Authority…The market has said to us privately that they 
would regard the Procuring Authority as best practice in terms of roads…People have 
just said it to us privately that they find it a very good organisation to deal with. They 
understand the process and the industry is comfortable with them (DOTTAS official). 
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The Procuring Authority acknowledges that a number of public sector stakeholders 
have legitimate interests in PPPs and the Procuring Authority is very proactive and 
accommodating in terms of managing the expectations of all public sector 
stakeholders: 
The Department of Finance and the PPP unit discuss ideas with the Procuring Authority 
through their informal advisory group…The Procuring Authority has an open-door 
policy, which facilitates engagement and interaction with all PPP stakeholders (Procuring 
Authority official). 
 
The Procuring Authority has the experience of allocating risk appropriately, however, 
the NDFA help foster a collaborative relationship by helping out with financial 
aspects of the deals. A NDFA official outlined how the Procuring Authority 
accommodates their views in the risk allocation process: 
The NRA has a good model and a good record and so why would you disturb that. There 
is a specialist and expertise there, so there was no need for us to be procuring in respect 
of those areas. We are however the financial advisors to the projects (NDFA official). 
 
A member of the Procuring Authority outlined that the risk allocation schemes which 
it has used on schemes are successful. The NDFA are perceived as a legitimate 
stakeholder by the Procuring Authority and their views are accommodated in the risk 
allocation process (see table 3 for an example of a typical risk allocation matrix), but 
as the model works for the Procuring Authority there is no need to try and do 
something radically different: 
We have our contract, we have the risk allocation set out and we know it has worked in 
the past. We go to public sector advisor risk workshops, absolutely, but I mean again 
there is a path trodden, we are not trying to reinvent any wheels, but certainly on a 
scheme by scheme basis we would have to do a risk assessment and a risk analysis… 
They are very much part of our day to day business (Procuring Authority official). 
An insight into the vast array of risks involved in Irish PPP projects was provided by a 
member of the NDFA and the collaborative relationship with the Procuring Authority 
was again emphasised by the NDFA official: 
In every project there would be a log of at least a couple of thousand risks… planning 
risks, ground conditions risk, archaeology risk, funding risk, operational risks, you know 
latent defects you name it all the way through the whole life and residual value risk as 
well…There is work with the workshops and there is a report written on every aspect of 
this, you know it always has to be documented and agreed. Agreed by the Procuring 
Authority, by the steering group within it (NDFA official). 
 
To summarise, the Procuring Authority understands the PPP market and have the 
required experience to allocate risk. The other public sector stakeholders recognise 
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this; therefore they tend not to interfere with the Procuring Authority. It would appear 
that the Procuring Authority manages their relationships with other public sector 
stakeholders in a proactive and accommodating manner. 
 
6.2 Relationship between Procuring Authority and SPV 
This section examines how PPP risks, including archaeological and ground conditions 
risk, are transferred and managed in the relationship between the Procuring Authority 
and the SPV.   
 
The Procuring Authority outlined the importance of contractual obligations being 
fulfilled by the SPV and indicated that they may allow it some degree of flexibility if 
the contract is being delivered satisfactorily. Such flexibility can foster a stronger 
relationship between the public and private sector, as the interviewees across the 
schemes suggested that there may now be a closer relationship between the Procuring 
Authority and the SPV in PPPs, with some flexibility and discretion being used when 
interpreting PPP contracts. An example of this type of discretion was explained by 
one of the equity investors in the SPV with regard to operational risk: 
They have a contract and they apply the contract sometimes really bad but the real thing 
is that they are applying the contract in a very fair way... If they apply the contract to the 
letter it would be tough (Equity investor). 
 
A senior debt financier outlined how an emphasis was placed on resolving any 
difficulties through engagement and collaboration before referring to the contract. The 
relationship between the Procuring Authority and the SPV members helped in terms 
of risk management as explained by a senior debt financier: 
The risk that did arise had been very well managed and it had been managed well 
because of the benefit of the partnership arrangement between the Procuring Authority 
and the sponsor.  So one thing that I particularly did find was that you had the situation 
where contractually the Procuring Authority can do a, b or c, but it has chosen not to 
truly enforce that (Senior debt financier). 
The Procuring Authority showed urgency in terms of dealing with the concerns of the 
senior debt financiers in one of the PPPs. Flexibility was evident and an 
understanding was reached between the public and private stakeholders, with demand 
risk taken by the public sector while some additional road works were being 
conducted on an adjoining road: 
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We got the Procuring Authority to insulate us…They took that risk for the period of time 
that those works were ongoing and they accepted that if the traffic dropped below a 
certain level that they would help with any revenue shortfall (Senior debt financier). 
Similarly, an equity investor on one of the schemes indicated that the contract became 
a bit more flexible as trustful relationships developed over time: 
I think the parties know each other well enough, and there is a little bit more flexibility 
on site to that flexibility that is in the contract. This means that the contract is very 
workable... So it is very tight within reason but if people are reasonable, the process can 
work, that is the case, but if you put the entire contract to the extreme, the contract is 
very tight (Equity investor). 
The goodwill evident in Irish road PPP contracts was also illustrated by one of the 
equity investors: 
You are now in a completely new form of contract, where there is partnership and the 
resolution of problems between all of the key stakeholders together… I would say on 
Scheme X that we have a more proactive client who believes, who is familiar with the 
D&B (Design and Build) in the PPP process and you know would go by the ethos that 
my problem is your problem and so let’s get together and sort it (Equity investor).  
A Procuring Authority representative suggested that they may adopt an 
accommodating approach by not always imposing penalties on the SPV regarding 
operational issues even though they have the power to do so. This lenient attitude to 
the imposition of penalties arguably helps to develop more goodwill between the 
Procuring Authority and the SPV, and helps foster better relationships between the 
stakeholders:  
We have a lot of powers in our contracts. I mean we don’t go out and start penalising 
people day one… Unless there is something major we feel we have to, I would say that 
we are dealing with companies that are very professional, and their management are very 
high calibre. Yes we would have headaches sometimes about things. They obviously 
have a view, and we have a view about what should happen (Procuring Authority 
official). 
The Procuring Authority adopted a proactive approach as it retained the majority of 
the archaeological risk in all the schemes, which helped to mitigate this risk and 
fostered stronger relationships and trust with the SPV. The equity investors 
acknowledged the help received from the Procuring Authority in terms of managing 
this risk: 
To be fair to the Procuring Authority the phase was resolved. They endeavoured to 
resolve all archaeology on the site before we got the site and they would have spent €10 
million on it i.e. doing surveys on the site, desk top surveys, actually doing split trenches, 




A Procuring Authority representative explained how they attempt not to transfer 
excessive risk to the SPV using archaeology as an example. The public sector helped 
to manage the archaeological risk as a Procuring Authority representative explained:  
We don’t ask people to take something that is actually unmanageable. Archaeology, for 
example we don’t just say you find what you find and it is all your risk. For that you pay 
a premium a massive premium, and that would be silly. We don’t give them that risk it is 
too high….If you are giving them a big blank problem that they know nothing about, 
then no that does not work, so we have tried to do something different, we have tried to 
manage the problem (Procuring Authority official).  
An equity investor outlined that help was also forthcoming from the public sector in 
terms of mitigating ground conditions risk, which mediated the difficulties being 
faced by the SPV: 
 
The Procuring Authority said they would manage a lot of the ground conditions risk. As 
part of the tender documentation they gave us a comprehensive site investigation. But 
actually they try to mitigate the risk for us in that sense but you know it is our risk, the 
contractor’s risk (Equity investor). 
 
Overall, the findings suggest that trust and goodwill may exist between the Procuring 
Authority and the SPV. A collaborative relationship appears to be evident between the 
NRA and the SPV in terms of managing archaeological and ground conditions risk. 
These risks tend to be mitigated for the SPV in a proactive manner by the NRA. 
 
The next section will summarise the findings and draw some conclusions based on the 
empirical data in the study. 
 
7. Summary and some concluding comments 
Utilising a stakeholder framework, this paper focuses on how the Procuring Authority 
manages its relationship with other public sector stakeholders and the SPV in Irish 
road PPPs. It also highlights how the allocation and management of risk may impact 
on the quality of stakeholder relationships in road PPPs. The theoretical framework is 
derived from an examination of the extant literature on stakeholder theory and the 
framework is further informed and refined by the in-depth interview findings with 36 
key stakeholders in the Irish PPP roads sector.  
The findings from this research indicated that there may be a number of significant 
stakeholders with legitimate interests regarding how risk is allocated in PPPs. There is 
an emerging view among the interviewees that the Irish public sector authorities and 
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advisors may be working collaboratively as the Procuring Authority recognises that 
there are a host of public sector stakeholders with interests in the PPP process such as 
the PPP unit, DOTTAS and the Department of Finance, and they are proactive and 
accommodating in terms of making a concerted effort to address the concerns of 
public sector stakeholders who often have conflicting objectives.  
Public sector stakeholders perceive that the Procuring Authority may be efficient and 
experienced at allocating risk, highlighted by the fact that the Procuring Authority is 
primarily responsible for all matters pertaining to risk allocation. There is also some 
evidence to suggest that there may be a supportive relationship between the public 
authorities who do not interfere with each other’s roles in the allocation of risk. For 
example, in the context of the theoretical framework the NDFA’s views appear to be 
accommodated by the Procuring Authority in the risk allocation process. The NDFA 
seem to play an important role in how risk is allocated from a strategic policy level in 
PPPs by providing advice to procuring authorities on developing risk allocation 
schemes and matters concerning risk in PPPs. Public sector advisors, including the 
NDFA also suggest that the Procuring Authority has the required expertise to allocate 
risk appropriately in PPPs. The Procuring Authority appears to manage its 
relationships with public sector stakeholders in a proactive and accommodating 
manner with trust and mutual respect also evident between the public sector 
stakeholders.  
 
The Procuring Authority also indicates that it adopts a proactive approach towards 
managing the concerns of the SPV in the risk transfer process which appears to have 
improved the quality of the relationship between the two parties. Arguably, this is the 
case with archaeological risk, where a significant amount of this risk is now retained 
by the Procuring Authority, due to the inability of the SPV to manage this risk when it 
is transferred to them. Sharing archaeological risk may have helped to dispel the fears 
of the SPV and particularly the senior debt financiers regarding archaeological risk. 
Senior debt financiers usually provide up to 90% of the finance in PPP projects and 
the findings suggest that they use this large stake and power to influence the risk 
allocation process. The findings of this study suggest that engaging in such risk-
sharing between the public and private sector may be necessary to ensure the 




Arguably the supportive relationship between the Procuring Authority and the SPV 
was improved when the Procuring Authority acted proactively by assuming demand 
risk temporarily on one of the schemes in order to alleviate private sector concerns 
and ensure that the private sector would not suffer any financial loss. Such 
engagement and collaboration between the parties helped to foster goodwill and 
enhance relationships. Additionally, the Procuring Authority may not always penalise 
the SPV, thus emphasising the goodwill prevalent between the two parties in PPP 
road contracts.   Although it has significant power, it appears to be accommodating 
towards the SPV when dealing with the issue of penalties. While such an 
accommodating approach involving goodwill may help a ‘quid pro quo’ relationship 
to develop between the public and private sector, it could be argued that maintaining 
VFM for the taxpayer is still required, as the Government framework on PPPs (see 
table 3) outlines that penalties should be imposed for poor performance. 
 
Taxpayers’ needs could be accommodated more in the risk allocation process; 
however, due to a large number of stakeholders in PPPs, it may be problematic to 
satisfy all their needs, including the taxpayers, in the risk allocation process. If PPPs 
are justified on the basis of effective risk transfer and VFM, it requires more visibility 
and accountability to taxpayers. It is therefore significant that the government’s VFM 
claims for PPPs in Ireland go beyond rhetoric and they demonstrate that PPPs are 
beneficial not just to the private sector but to all the stakeholders concerned. Yet 
ascertaining whether VFM has been achieved through risk transfer on PPP toll roads 
is problematic as the Public Sector Benchmark which prices risk is confidential and 
not publicly disclosed. More disclosure of information on the Public Sector 
Benchmark and detailed VFM reports are required as this would help determine 
whether risk is transferred equitably, priced accurately, and ultimately leads to VFM 
in PPPs. Recent publications by the Comptroller and Auditor General (2011, 2012) on 
PPP projects have shown that PPPs are costing the taxpayer considerable sums of 
money and therefore further analysis by the Irish Comptroller and Auditor General on 
risk transfer in the roads sector would be valuable.  
 
Additional research in other sectors such as education, prisons, health and water 
would also be fruitful as the occurrence and timing of risks and their subsequent 
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management by stakeholders may differ. For instance, risk may be more significant in 
the construction phase of roads PPPs but may be more problematic in the operational 
phase in hospitals.  Further research could use this conceptual framework to examine 
stakeholder management strategies adapted in other countries. The relationship 
between the Department of Finance, the Procuring Authority and the SPV could also 
be investigated, as they may have different expectations or conflicting objectives in 
the PPP process. A deeper understanding of the complexity of these stakeholder 
relationships may provide useful insights for policymakers in terms of understanding 
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Although the Minister for Transport is responsible for overall strategic policy and 
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Table 2 Factors Contributing Towards Stakeholder Relationships in PPPs  
Factors Contributing Towards Stakeholder 
Relationships 
Empirical Work 
Collaboration - This refers to the different 
parties in PPPs working in unison together on 
key PPP tasks. 
Smyth and Edkins (2007), Koppenjan and Enserink 
(2009)  
Autonomy – This relates to the parties in PPPs 
being provided with the autonomy and power to 
make key decisions.  
Baker, Justice and Skelcher  (2009) 
Goal Congruence- This refers to parties having 
similar goals within the PPP process and 
working together to attain the same 
goals/objectives. 
Koppenjan (2005), Runde, Offutt, Selinger and 
Bolton  (2010) 
Flexibility in Contracts - This relates to the 
extent to which contracts are flexible 
in PPPs, with flexibility allowed rather than a 
contractual rigid inflexible approach. 
Edwards and Shaoul (2003), Smith et al. (2006), 
Baker et al. (2009), Norton and Blanco (2009), 
Runde et al.(2010), English and Baxter (2010) 
Incentives - These refer to rewards which 
incentivise parties to work towards the projects 
objectives. 
Asenova and Beck (2003), Koppenjan and Enserink 
(2009), Dunn- Cavelty and Suter (2009), English and 
Baxter (2010) 
Payment Mechanisms – This refers to the form 
of payment mechanism used to incentivise the 
private sector party in PPPs. Availability/ 
unitary payments and user pays fees are two 
forms of payment mechanisms in PPPs. 
English and Baxter (2010) 
Trust – This refers to the extent to which the Koppenjan (2005), Koch and Buser (2006), English 
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parties rely and believe in each other in PPPs. and Baxter (2010) 
Goodwill – This relates to the way in which 
parties will show a sense of camaraderie and 
willingness to help the other party in the 
agreement. 
English and Baxter (2010) 
Relational Management – This is meant in the 
sense that the parties form a relationship rather 
than a strictly contractual relationship in the 
PPP. 
Smyth and Edkins (2007)  
Knowledge and resource sharing – This refers 
to the willingness of the parties in PPPs to share 
ideas, good practices as well as financial 
resources in the PPP process. 
Asenova and Beck (2003), Klijn and Teisman (2003), 
Hodges and Grubnic (2010)  
Governance Schemes - The rules and 
regulation under which a particular system 
works. 
Teisman and Klijn (2002), Hodges and Grubnic 
(2010) 
Risk Transfer - Risks are transferred from the 
public sector to the private sector in PPPs in 
order to ensure Value For Money. 
Edwards and Shaoul (2003), Dunn-Cavelty and Suter 
(2009), Runde et al. (2010) 
(Demirag and Burke, 2013) 
 
Table 3 Sample Risk Allocation Matrix 
 
 
Risk Category Allocation and Comments 
Planning risk May be held by the Contracting Authority. 
Design and Construction 
Risk 
Contractor is transferred these risks and is 
responsible for costs and time overruns as well as 
any alterations to output specification. 
Operating Risk Transferred to the contractor and penalties are 
imposed for inadequate service or failure to meet 
contractual commitments. 
Demand Risk Often retained or shared. May be transferred in 
Design Build Operate and Finance and concession 
contracts where the private sector can predict future 
traffic levels with reasonable certainty or can 
control demand risk. 
Residual Value Risk May be transferred under Design Build Operate and 
Finance and concession contracts. The contractor 
takes the residual value risk if the asset is not 
automatically transferred to the Contracting 
Authority following the contracts duration.  
Other Financial Risk In concession and Design Build Operate and 
Finance contracts, these risks tend to be transferred 
to the private sector.  
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Legislative Risk Government is often in the best position to control 
regulatory and legislative risks.  
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Figure 3 Overview of Stakeholder Relationships in Irish Road PPPs 
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(Adapted from Smith et al., 2006; Baker et al.,2009; Dunn Cavelty and Sutter 2009; Hodges 
and Grubnic, 2010; Demirag and Burke, 2013) 
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